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Appellate Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code. Ann.§ 78A-4103(2)(h) in that this is an appeal from a domestic relations case regarding divorce.

Issues
The following subjects are at issue in this brief:
1. Where a Petitioner admits lying to the court in order to obtain alternate service,
and service was not otherwise perfected, the district court did not have jurisdiction
to enter an Order and should have set aside the Divorce Decree under Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(4) as void.
a. The propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not
to vacate, becomes a question of law upon which no deference is granted to
the district court." Miles v. Miles, 2011 UT App 359, ,I 6, 269 P. 3d 958 (quoti,~g
Department of Soc. Servs. v. Vf;i'l, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)). Factual

findings underlying the jurisdictional issue are reviewed for clear error. Miles,
2011 UT App 359 ,I 6, (quoting Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, ,I 7, 22 P.3d
1249). When a court of general jurisdiction enters a judgment, however, the
existence of jurisdiction is presumed, and the burden of demonstrating its
absence lies with the party attacking it. Miles, 2011 UT App 359, (quoting
Jackson Constr. Co. v. Alam·, 2004 Uf 89, ii 9, 100 P.3d 1211).
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b. Respondent's Rule 60(6) Motion to Set Aside and Quash Service, R. at 130132; Memorandum in Support of Rule 60(6) Motion to Set Aside and Quash
Service, R. at 133-141.
2. Where a Petitioner fails to comply with the requirements regarding alternate
service under Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(b), specifically mailing a copy of the Order
for Alternate Service, and failing to comply with the remaining portions of the
Order for Alternate Service, there is no effective service and the court is without
jurisdiction to enter a Decree of Divorce.
a. "An appellate challenge to a district court's refusal to set aside a default
judgment for lack of jurisdiction presents a question of law, for which no
discretion is afforded to the district court." Sewell v. Xpress L11be, 2013 UT 61, 1
16, 321 P. 3d 1080.
b. Respondent's Rule 60(6) Motion to Set Aside and Quash Service, R. at 130132; Memorandum in Support of Rule 60(6) Motion to Set Aside and Quash
Service, R. at 133-141.
3. Where a method of service is improper, it is appropriate to quash service.
a. Whether service of process was proper is a jurisdictional issue and the
standard of review is a correction-of-error standard." Paar v. Stubbs, 2005 UT
App 310, ,I 4, 117 P. 3d 1079 (quoting Parkside Salt Lake Co,p. v. Insure-Rite, I11t:,
2001 UT App 347, ,I 16, 37 P.3d 1202.
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b. Respondent's Rule 60(6) Motion to Set Aside and Quash Service, R. at 130132; Memorandum in Support of Rule 60(6) 1\fotion to Set Aside and Quash
Service, R. at 133-141.

Operative Statutes and Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 4 is set out verbatim as part of the addendum.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the
court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before
the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may
be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.

(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(6); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief frorr.
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 90 days after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside
a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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Statement of the Case
At issue is a divorce proceeding between Karina Barba (Appellee) and Eric Vasquez
(Appellant). Appellee filed for divorce in August of 2008, and obtained a divorce decree in
April of 2009. The Divorce Decree was obtained as a result of an Order for Alternate
Service pursuant to Appellee's request for such.
In October 2014 Appellant, acting prose, filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment
with Request for Mandatory Judicial Notice wherein Appellant asserted that he was never

se:ved and requested that the Court vacate all orders in the case. Commissioner Luhn
declined to address the request in a December 2014 minute entry, stating that nothing had
been filed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 101.
Appellant then obtained counsel and filed a Motion to Set Aside pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(6) in May of 2015, alleging that Appellee had lied to the Court in obtaining
permission to serve Appellant in an alternative manner. Appellant requested that the court
set aside the Decree of Divorce and quash service. Appellee then filed an opposition to the
·Motion, admitting that she had lied to the Court in her Motion for Alternate Service, but
justified the lies by alleging that she was scared of .Appellant because of alleged previous
domestic violence. A hearing on the motion was held in June of 2015.
At the hearing Commissioner Luhn ruled that the Court did not have jurisdiction
because of a lack of service. However, the Commissioner observed that some notes written
by Appellant in February of 2011 mentioned the divorce, and therefore found that Appellant
had notice of the divorce at that time. The Commissioner then ruled that the amount of
tirqe that had passed between February 2011 and when Appellant had sought to set aside the
7

Decree were not within a reasonable time, and therefore denied the Motion to Set Aside.
The Commissioner also found that setting aside the Decree would have an adverse impact
on a separate case wherein Appellee had filed to tenninate Appellant's parental rights
regarding the party's minor daughter. 1 Finally, the court also found that setting aside the
Decree would be an undue hardship. This appeal followed.

Statement of Facts
1. Appellee filed for Divorce in August of 2008. R. at 1.
2. Appellee filed a Verified Petition for Alternate Service on August 11, 2008. R. at 15-20.
3. The district court granted the Petition for Alternate Service and ordered that the
Summons and Complaint be mailed to an address in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico. R. at
23.
4. The district court did not order that a copy of the Order for Alternate Service be served
with the Summons and Complaint. Id.
5. The district court did order that the only relief that would be granted under this service
would be a divorce. In other words, the requested relief regarding custody, property, etc,
would not be granted unless service was obtained pursuant to the Hague Convention. Id.
6. Appellee filed an Affidavit of Mailing, wherein she certified that she mailed a copy of the
Summons along with a copy of the '"Verified Petition for Alternate Services" to the
address in Mexico. Appellee did not aver that she had sent a copy of the Complaint, nor
did she aver that she had sent a copy of the Order for Alternate Service. R. at 30-33.

1

Appellant's parental rights have subsequently been terminated, as of November

2015.
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7. ..Appellee then submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as a
proposed Decree of Divorce, for signature. The Court denied the Decree as submitted,
noting that the Court would only grant a divorce, or that Appellee would have to obtain
service pursuant to the Hague Convention. Minute Entry, R. at 59 -60.

8. Pursuant to a subsequent filing, the Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law
along with a Decree of Divorce and Judgment on April 8, 2009. R. at 61-67.

9. No other pleadings or motions were filed until August 7, 2013 when Appellee requested
an extension of time to respond to a motion that was never filed with the court. R. at 71-

79.
10. On October 14, 2014 Appellant filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment, with Request
for Mandatory Judicial Notice.Rat 99-103. Appellant requested, among other relief, that
the Court vacate all previous orders. R. at 100.

11. On December 8, 2014 2 Appellant filed a Movant's Status Request; with Demand to
Vacate; and Request for Telephonic Hearing. R. at 104-108. Appellant requested, among
other relief, that the "void judgments" be vacated and that the matter be set for a
telephonic hearing. R. at 106.

12. On December 10, 2014 the commissioner "declined" Appellant's request in a minute
entry, stating that nothing had been filed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 101. R. at 109.

2

This Motion was served on December 2, 2014, and postmarked on December 3,
2C14. R. at 107-108.
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13. In the meantime, on December 2, 2014, Appellant had been served with pleadings
indicating that Appellee had filed to allow her current husband to adopt the Appellant's
daughter, and simultaneously tenninate .Appellant's parental rights. R. at 11-116.
14. Appellant then obtained counsel through the modest means program with the Utah State
Bar, and filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside and Quash Service, with a supporting
Memorandum and Declaration. R. at 130-171. Alternative motions were also filed to
consolidate the instant case with a paternity case that had been filed by Appellant, as wdl
as an alternative Motion for Temporary Orders. R. at 123 -124, 214-217.
15. As part of the Memorandum, Appellant alleged that Appellee had lied in obtaining
pennission to serve the Summons and Complaint by alternate means. R. at 134-135.
16. Appellee timely filed a Verified Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside and
Quash Service and Motion for Temporary Orders. R. at 222-395.
17. Appellee admitted that she did not serve the serve Appellant with the "divorce
documents" because "she feared for the safety of herself and her child if Respondent
knew she intended to divorce him." R. at 224. B11! if. R. at 227, where Appellee states that
"she was in contact with [Appellant] before and after [Appellant]'s incarceration and she
informed [..Appellant] on more than one occasion that she intended to obtain a divorce
from [Appellant]."
18. Appellee admitted that she did not serve the Petition for Divorce as ordered by the
district court, nor did she serve the Order for Alternate Service. R. at 227-228.
19. A hearing was held onjune11, 2015, wherein the commissioner admitted that the co..1r1
did not have jurisdiction because of a lack of service. R. at 487.

10

20. The commissioner found that because of a note in 2011, Appellant had notice of the
divorce at that time. Further, the commissioner found that Appellant did not act
diligently "to determine exactly what his rights were." Id.
21. 'Tbe commissioner then found that it was not reasonable to bring a Motion to Set Aside
three or four years later. Id.
22. Finally, the commissioner found that it would not be in the child's best interests, and that
setting aside the Decree could negatively impact the termination case that had been filed.
Id.

Summary of .Arguments
Appellee has admitted, and the Court has noted, that (1) Appellant was not properly
served and (2) Appellee lied to the court in obtaining permission to serve Appellant in an
Alternate Manner. Both of these admissions are grounds to set aside a judgment pursuant to

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(6)(4) as void. While a court normally has discretion as to whether or not
to set aside an order, there is no discretion when an order is void.
Where the Commissioner found that the Court did not have jurisdiction, but then
exercised her discretion to find that Appellant had not acted within a reasonable amount of
time~ the Commissioner erred as a matter of law. Because service has never been completed,

any judgments should be set aside and service should be quashed.

Argument
The case at hand is very similar to Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288 (Utah 1986). In
C.1n.:-/,1, the parties were marrie<l and ha<l one child as issue of the marriage. Id. at 289.
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Father was sent to prison for burglary and grand larceny. Id. at 298, n. 1. Mother sought and
obtained a divorce. Id. at 298. The Supreme Court later determined that the divorce was
predicated on faulty service. Id. at 299. Father was released from prison and filed his Motion
to Set Aside two years after his release from prison, and ten years after the entry of the
divorce Decree. The Supreme Court remanded the case "for entry of judgment vacating the
decree of divorce because of the ineffective service of process." Id. at 292.
Here, the parties were married and had one child as a result of the relationship.
Appellant and father was sent to prison for 8 years. Appellee and mother sought and
obtained a divorce. Appellee has admitted that she obtained the divorce on faulty service,
specifically her misleading affidavit and the failure to comply with the Order for Alternate
Service. Father moved to set aside the Decree, which was 6 years old at the time. 3
Unfortunately, instead of setting aside the decree for ineffective service of process, as
was done in Garcia, the Commissioner denied the motion based on discretionary grounds,
which is a legal error under Utah law.

I. The Judgment is Void Because Petitioner Lied to the Court
A court may relieve a party from a judgment for several reasons, including
determining that a judgment is void. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). "If a plaintiff falsely avers or
intentionally misleads a court to believe that he or she has exercised such diligence when he
or she has not done so, the court, although at the time appearing to have jurisdiction, never
had jurisdiction because the plaintiff never met the [due process] constitutional mandate."
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P. 2d 768, 773 (Utah App 1997). "[f]he fundamental

3

As opposed to the 10 year old decree in Carda.
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requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard, at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner." Hollenbach v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 2015 UT App 116, ,I
8 (quoting DepartmentoJTransp. v. Osgutho,pe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995)).
In the present case Appellee has admitted that she intentionally mislead the Court to
believe that she had exercised due diligence when she had not done so. Appellee has
attempted to justify her deceit based on a professed fear that harm may come to her. 4
Nevertheless, there is no factual dispute as to whether or not Appellee mislead the Court.
Thus, even though the Court appeared to have jurisdiction when the Court entered the
Decree of Divorce, the Court did not have jurisdiction. Appellee had not fulfilled the due
process requirements. Appellant had no opportunity to be heard in any way prior to the
entry of Decree, let alone at a meaningful time or meaningful manner. Consequently, the
Coui1: is without jurisdiction and the judgment is void. 5

II. The Judgment is Void Because Petitioner Did not Comply with the
Court Order or Utah R. Civ. P. 4 (d)(4)(B)
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(b), when a court grants a request for alternate service,
"[u]nless service is by publication, a copy of the court's order shall be served upon the
defendant with the process specified by the court." Thus, the court need not specify that the
Order for Alternate Service be served with the Summons and Complaint. If there is no
effective service of process, a court is without jurisdiction to enter the original decree of
divorce, as the requirements of Rule 4 relating to service of process are jurisdictional. See, e.g.,

The district court made no findings as to whether or not the deceit was justified.
Interestingly, the district court admitted that it did not have jurisdiction, and
nevertheless refused to set aside the Decree on discretionary grounds, discussed below.
·1

5
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Martin v. Nelson, Utah, 533 P.2d 897 (1975); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22,484 P.2d 164
(1971); Fibreboard Paper Products v. Dietrich, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
When the district court granted the request for alternate service, the Court specifically
required that the Summons and the Complaint be served at the noted addresses. In
Appellee's Affidavit of Mailing, she lists only the Summons and the Verified Petition for
Alternative Service. Nowhere does it state that she mailed a copy of the complaint, nor did
she mail a copy of the Order for Alternate Service. Appcllee has attempted to ask for
leniency as she was appearingpro seat the time. While reasonable considerations for prose
parties are certainly appropriate, parties that represent themselves are held to the same
standard as any licensed attorney and they are subject to the consequences of their decision
to function as an attorney without being trained as an attorney. ~uller v. Springville Ci!J, 2015
UT App 177, ,I 20.

Because Appellee failed to comply with the district court's order, and because she
failed to comply with Rule 4 by not including a copy of the Order for Alternate Service, the
service purported to have occurred was defective, and the court was without jurisdiction to
enter the default and resulting Decree. As such, the decree is void.

III. There is No Discretion in Setting Aside a Void Order
While a court usually has discretion in setting aside a judgment, if the judgment is
void "the court has no discretion, and the judgment must be set aside." Workman v. .L1\Jagle
Constr., Inl~, 802 P.2d 749, 754 n. 11 (Utah.Ct.App.1990), see also Classic Cabinets, In": v. Al!
American Lfle Insurance Co., 978 P. 2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1999). If a judgment is entered by
a court that lacks jurisdiction, justice is furthered by setting that judgment aside as void
14

under rule 60(b)(4) even absent a separate meritorious defense. Judson v. Wheeler RV Las

Vegas, LLC, 2012 UT 6, ,r 15, 270 P. 3d 456. The requirement that the motion be made
within a "reasonable time," which seems literally to apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4),
cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. A void judgment cannot acquire
validity because of laches on the part of the judgment debtor. Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288, 290-291
(quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil§ 2862). Several Utah cases
have relied on or restated the principle that if the judgment is void then the time limitations
of rule 60(b) have no application and the court is without discretion to set the matter aside.

See, e.g., lvligliore v. Livingston Financial, LLC, 2015 UT 9, iJ 24; Utah Down Syndrome Foundation,
Inc: v. Utah Down Syndrome Association, 2012 UT 86, ,r 28, 29 3 P .3d 241 ;6 Jack.ron Construction

Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, iJ 8, 100 P.3d 1211; Bonneville Billing, 949 P. 2d 768, 771 n. 2; KO v.
Denison, 748 P. 2d 588,592 (Utah App 1988); Woocry v. Rhodes, 461 P.2d 465,466 (1969).
In the present case, the commissioner agreed that the court was without jurisdiction.
H owcver, the commissioner relied on equitable grounds in refusing to set aside the Decree.
One ground relied on was an idea that because Appellant had mentioned a divorce in
some notes he took in 2011, he was then on notice of the existence of the judgment. The
commissioner reasoned that by not acting diligently on this notice, Appellant had lost his
right to set aside the Decree.

Also stating that "[i.Jn Garcia, we held that a man who had waited ten years after the
entry of judgment to file a 60(b) motion to vacate was not disqualified based on timeliness
concerns because "where the judgment is void because of a fatally defective service of
process, the time limitations of[r]ulc 60(b) have no application."
6
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Another discretionary ground that the commissioner relied on was that setting aside
the Decree would harm the child at issue by interfering with the termination case being
heard by a different judge in the probate court.
The combination of these two arguments is essentially finding Appellant guilty of
laches. 7 The commissioner found that Appellant was not diligent, and that Appellee was
harmed by the lack of diligence.
The doctrine of laches is at the very least a mixed question of law and fact, and a
district court is allowed some discretion in applying laches to a case. V rysry v. V rysry, 2014
UT App 264, ,I 6, 339 P. 3d 131.
By invoking the doctrine of laches, the commissioner ran afoul of the rule that there
is no discretion in setting aside a void judgment. If there were a timeliness analysis, then a
court would necessarily have to use discretion in analyzing whether a Motion to Set Aside
under Rule 60(6)(4) was reasonably timely. This would run contrary to the case law mandate
that setting aside a void judgment involves no discretion.
Further, our case law specifically states that a void judgment cannot acquire validity
because of !aches. Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288, 290-291.
'fhe commissioner erred as a matter of law when she invoked equitable principles in
refusing to set aside the void decree. There is no allowance for equity, and any court
considering a void judgment is without discretion when asked to set it aside.

"[L]aches has two elements: (1) a party's lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from
that lack of diligence." t'undamenta/ist Church ojjestts v. Lindbe,;g,, 2010 UT 51, ,r 27,238 P. 3d 1054.
"The length of time that constitutes a lack of diligence depend[sl on the circumstances of each
case." Id.
7
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IV. ~'here a Method of Service is Improper, it is Appropriate to Quash
Service and Set Aside Any Orders
Where a court does not have jurisdiction, service should be quashed and any orders
based on the faulty service should be vacated. Parkside Salt L.ake Corp., 2001 UT App 347, ,I
34 (holding "[t]he trial court erred in not quashing the summons and did not have personal
jurisdiction to hear the claims against Tenant. We therefore vacate each of the orders issued
below and remand for the trial court to enter an order quashing the summons.")

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Appellant requests that this Court reverse the
commissioner's refusal to set aside the Decree of Divorce, quash service, and remand for
further proceedings with the district court.

DATED this 16th day of December, 2015.
ussell Y auney
Attorney for Appellant
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Order Denying Motion to Set
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The Order of Court is stated below: .
I.@ Dated: July 22.1015
/s/ Kf~ M ~VHN :
0 I:40:33 PM
Dist~ict Court c.dmmissioncr

Russell Yauney (13409)
357 S 200 E Suite 103
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
russell@rylegal.com
(801) 519-4774
Attorney for Respondent

In the District Court of Utah
Third Judicial District. Salt Lake County

KARINA BARBA,
Petitioner

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET
ASIDE
Civil No. 084903557

V.

ERIC VASQUEZ,
Respondent

Judge Richard McKelvie
Commissioner Kim M Luhn

THE HEARING on the Motion to Set Aside and Quash Service and Respondent's
Motion for Temporary Orders ,vas held on June 1 l. 2014, pursuant to notice, Commissioner Kim

M Luhn presiding. Respondent appeared in person and was represented by counsel. Russell
Yauney. Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by counsel. Cassie Medura. The
parties having proffered their testimony through counsel, the Court having heard argument of
counsel. having reviewed the file in this matter and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises. the court finds. concludes and enters orders as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Thc:re are no custody orders in this case and no Pc:tition to ModitY is required.

00486

2. Respondent did not need to set aside the Decree in order to bring a Motion for Temporary
Orders.

3. It is conceded that service was inadequate and that the court had no personal jurisdiction over
Respondent at the time the divorce was entered.
4. However, in his own writing. Respondent acknowledges that he was divorced in 2011.
5. At that time Respondent had to act diligently in order to determine exactly what his rights
were.

6. The timelines under Utah R. Civ. P 60(b) do not apply. However, a reasonable time
requirement does apply.
7. It is not reasonable to bring a Motion to Set Aside three or four years later.
8. Further, the only thing that has been entered is the divorce itself. The court is treating this as
a bifurcation. and those issues remain open for detem1ination under motions for temporary
orders.
9. It is not in the child's best interest and would ham1 the child to uproot the process that they
are currently involved in to have her adopted with the trial in two weeks. It is more
appropriate for the judge in the adoption action to determine if Respondent's parental rights
shoul<l be tenninated. base<l on the facts an<l not a setting aside of a marriage which they
would have to be married for a year in order to tile an adoption proceeding. The adoption and
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termination outcome should not be based on a legal technicality.

I 0. If the termination is not granted. Respondent shall, at his own expense, obtain an evaluation
as to whether it would even be in the child" s best interest to be introduced to him. This is not

a custody evaluation or a visitation evaluation. If the answer is yes. then how it should be
done.

11. It would be an undue hardship to set aside the Decree.
12. The court struggles as to whether or not the motion was brought in good faith in that all
issues besides the divorce (e.g. custody and parent-time) could have been brought by motion
as the Motion for Temporary Orders ,vas appropriately brought. Howevec despite believing
that the Motion to Set Aside was not brought in good faith, the court finds that it was brought
with merit and denies any attorney~ s fees based on bad faith.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
13. The Motion to Set Aside is denied.
14. The Motion for Temporary Orders is denied. HO\vever. if the termination is not granted,
Respondent shall. at his own expense. obtain an evaluation as to whether it would even be in
the child's best interest to be introduced to him. This is not a custody evaluation or a
visitation evaluation. If the ans\ver is yes. then how it should be done should be addressed.

15. This is the final order of the court and no further order is required.
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Such is the Order of the Court, as evidenced by the stamp and electronic signature on the first page of
this Order Denying Motion to Set Aside.

/s/ Cassie Medura
Attorney for Petitioner
with pennission via email

Certificate of Service
I certify that on July 16th, 2015, I caused the forgoing Order Denying Motion to Set Aside to be
served on the individuals below by the method noted~ in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 5:
Cassie J Medura
Via electronic filing

Isl Russell Yauney
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Utah R. Civ. P. 4

Rule 4. Process.
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the plaintiff or
the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and served.
(b)(i) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1 ), the summons
together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after the
filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause
shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be
dismissed, without prejudice on application of any party or upon the court's own
initiative.
(b)(ii) In any action brought against two or more defendants on which service has
been timely obtained upon one of them,
(b)(ii)(A) the plaintiff may proceed against those served, and
(b)(ii)(B) the others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial.

(c) Contents of summons.
(c)(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the court,
the names of the parties to the action, and the county in which it is brought. It shall
be directed to the defendant, state the name, address and telephone number of the
plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number.
It shall state the time within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint
in writing, and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the complaint
is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed with the court within ten
days of service.
(c)(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state that
the defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed within 10 days after
service and shall state the telephone number of the clerk of the court where the
defendant may call at least 14 days after service to determine if the complaint has
been filed.
(c)(3) If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject
matter and the sum of money or other relief demanded, and that the complaint is on
file with the court.
(d) Method of service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and
complaint shall be by one of the following methods:
24

(d)(1) Personal service. The summons and complaint may be served in any state
or judicial district of the United States by the sheriff or constable or by the deputy of
either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other person
18 years of age or older at the time of service and not a party to the action or a party's
attorney. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service
shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall state the name of the process
and offer to deliver a copy thereof. Personal service shall be made as follows:
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (B),
(C) or (D) below; by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the
individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there
residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process;
(d) (1) (B) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy
of the summons and the complaint to the infant and also to the infant's father,
mother or guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person
having the care and control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in
whose service the infant is employed;
(d)(1)(C) Upon an individual judicially declared to be of unsound mind or
incapable of conducting the person's own affairs, by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the person and to the person's legal representative
if one has been appointed and in the absence of such representative, to the
individual, if any, who has care, custody or control of the person;
(d)(1)(D) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated
by the state or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the person who has the care, custody, or control
of the individual to be served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or
conservator of the individual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in
any case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served;
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, upon a
partnership or upon an unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a
common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an
officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or
by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute
to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be
found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as
having, an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does
business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such
office or place of business;
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(d)(1)(F) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the recorder;
(d)(1)(G) Upon a county, by delivering a copy of the summons and the
complaint to the county clerk of such county;
(d)(l)(H) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy of
the summons and the complaint to the superintendent or business administrator
of the board;
(d)(1)(I) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the president or secretary of its board;
(d)(1)0) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be
brought against the state, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint
to the attorney general and any other person or agency required by statute to be
served; and
(d)(1)(K) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any
public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to any member of its governing board, or to its
executive employee or secretary.

(d) (2) Service by mail or commercial courier service.
(d)(2)(A) The summons and complaint may be served upon an individual other
than one covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(B) or (d)(1)(C) by mail or commercial
courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States provided the
defendant signs a document indicating receipt.
(d)(2)(B) The summons and complaint may be served upon an entity covered
by paragraphs (d)(1)(E) through (d)(l)(I) by mail or commercial courier service in
any state or judicial district of the United States provided defendant's agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process signs a
document indicating receipt.
(d)(2)(C) Service by mail or commercial courier service shall be complete on
the date the receipt is signed as provided by this rule.
(d)(3) Service in a foreign country. Service in a foreign country shall be made as
follows:
(d)(3)(A) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give
notice, such as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;
(d)(3)(B) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable
international agreement allows other means of service, provided that service is
reasonably calculated to give notice:
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(d)(3)(B)(i) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for
service in that country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;
(d)(3)(B)(ii) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter
rogatory or letter of request; or
(d)(3)(B)(iii) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by delivery
to the individual personally of a copy of the summons and the complaint or by
any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by
the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or
(d)(3)(C) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be
directed by the court.
(d)(4) Other service.
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are
unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where service
upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or
where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding
service of process, the party seeking service of process may file a motion
supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication or by
some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to
identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which make it
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties.
(d)(4)(B) If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by
means reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested
parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or
practicable. The court's order shall also specify the content of the process to be
served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed complete.
Unless service is by publication, a copy of the court's order shall be served upon
the defendant with the process specified by the court.
(d)(4)(C) In any proceeding where summons is required to be published, the
court shall, upon the request of the party applying for publication, designate the
newspaper in which publication shall be made. The newspaper selected shall be a
newspaper of general circulation in the county where such publication is required
to be made.
(e) Proof of service.

•

(e)(1) If service is not waived, the person effecting service shall file proof with the
court. The proof of service must state the date, place, and manner of service. Proof of
service made pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) shall include a receipt signed by the
defendant or defendant's agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process. If service is made by a person other than by an attorney, the

sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States :Marshal or by the
marshal's deputy, the proof of service shall be made by affidavit.
(e)(2) Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed in these
rules for service within this state, or by the law of the foreign country, or by order of
the court. When service is made pur.suant to paragraph (d)(3)(C), proof of service
shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the
addressee satisfactory to the court.
(e)(3) Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service.
The court may allow proof of service to be amended.

(f) Waiver of service; Payment of ~osts for refusing to waive.
(f) (1) A plaintiff may request a defendant subject to service under paragraph (d)

to

waive service of a summons. The request shall be mailed or delivered to the person
upon whom service is authorized under paragraph (d). It shall include a copy of the
complaint, shall allow the defendant at least 21 days from the date on which the
request is sent to return the waiver, or 30 days if addressed to a defendant outside of
the United States, and shall be substantially in the form of the Notice of Lawsuit and
Request for Waiver of Service of Summons set forth in the Appendix of Forms
attached to these rules.
(£)(2) A defendant who timely returns a waiver is not required to respond to the
complaint until 45 days after the date on which the request for waiver of service was
mailed or delivered to the defendant; or 60 days after that date if addressed to a
defendant outside of the United States.
(£)(3) A defendant who waives service of a summons does not thereby waive any
objection to venue or to the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant.
(£)(4) If a defendant refuses a request for waiver of service submitted in
accordance with this rule, the court shall impose upon the defendant the costs
subsequently incurred in effecting service.
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